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FUNDING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS* 
ABSTRACT 
Funding is an oft-overlooked but critically important determinant of what 
public institutions are able to accomplish. This article focuses on the 
growing role of earmarked voluntary contributions from member states in 
funding formal international organizations such as the United Nations and 
the World Health Organization. Heavy reliance on such funds can erode the 
multilateral governance of international organizations and poses particular 
risks for two kinds of undertakings: normative work, such as setting 
standards and identifying best practices; and evaluating the conduct of 
member states and holding those states accountable, including through 
public criticism, when they fall short. International organizations have 
devised strategies for mitigating these risks, but those strategies are 
generally not codified in formal policies and are not visible to the public. 
This Article argues that more formal regulations are needed and outlines 
some possibilities for the form they might take. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To my great fortune, my time as a student at New York Uni-
versity School of Law coincided with Dick Stewart and Benedict 
Kingsbury’s launching of the Global Administrative Law project. 
During my second year of law school, I joined their colloquium on 
Globalization and Its Discontents. Many of the papers presented 
that semester constituted the core of early work on global adminis-
trative law.1 The following year, I became a Furman Scholar and 
 
*  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Programming, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School. 
 1 A number of the papers presented at the colloquium were later published in 
the Summer/Autumn 2005 issue of Volume 68 of Law and Contemporary Prob-
lems. 
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Dick served as my mentor. It would be difficult to overstate the 
formative impact of the opportunity to learn from him, and of my 
exposure to the ideas that were articulated, challenged, and further 
developed at that colloquium. Those experiences have shaped my 
career and scholarship, prompting me to apply for a job at the State 
Department Legal Adviser’s Office after I graduated—and, while 
there, to take on a portfolio that included the United Nations Secu-
rity Council targeted sanctions regimes. My scholarship since join-
ing the faculty at the University of Michigan Law School has con-
tinued to wrestle with challenges of global governance that I first 
encountered as Dick’s student and mentee. It is a great honor to con-
tribute to this symposium celebrating Dick’s fiftieth year of teach-
ing. 
In this Article, I address a topic that legal scholars tend to ne-
glect: the funding of institutions that are engaged in regulation and 
governance.2 Both nationally and globally, decisions about funding 
are often less visible than decisions on substantive policies—though 
of course funding levels influence the extent to which those substan-
tive policies will be implemented and their goals will be achieved.3 
 
 2 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through In-
stitutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42 (2010) (describing funding as a “critical, 
though largely overlooked, key to [U.S. administrative agencies’] power”); HENRY 
G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 635 
(6th rev. ed. 2018) (describing the financing of international organizations as a 
“somewhat neglected” topic in the literature on the law of international organiza-
tions); THE FINANCES OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: 
FOLLOW THE MONEY (Ulf Engel & Frank Mattheis eds., 2020) (observing that this 
neglect is especially severe with respect to regional organizations in the Global 
South and taking some steps to remedy it). This lack of attention to funding (or 
“resource mobilization,” as insiders to organizations often refer to it) is an example 
of more general neglect of the internal policies and practices of international insti-
tutions. See Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International Institutions 
as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples, in 
THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 
(Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999) (arguing that, although the 
internal policies and practices of international institutions are often neglected, they 
have “considerable significance for international law.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation 
of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 328–29 (1991) 
(describing how skeptics of U.S. environmental statutes were “reluctant to voice 
publicly their opposition to the passage of the statutes—because of the popular 
appeal of environmental protection—but they felt far more secure in undermining 
the statutory mandates in a less visible way through the appropriations process,” 
and, as a result, “EPA has consistently received a level of funding far lower than 
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While funding is a crucial factor for the entire range of institutions 
engaged in global governance, I focus here on formal international 
organizations, like the United Nations or the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO), and their growing reliance on voluntary contribu-
tions from member states.4 To date, such voluntary contributions 
have remained largely unregulated, at least by formal rules; I argue 
that formal regulations of such contributions are needed. 
Typically, international organizations’ member states pay “as-
sessed contributions”—that is, membership dues that they set based 
on an agreed formula—to fund the organizations’ regular budgets.5 
Organizations’ regular budgets have always been rather paltry, at 
least compared to their ambitious goals. In 1964, John Stoessinger 
observed that “the short history of international organizations has 
been marked by the tendency of states to invest only the most mea-
ger financial resources, and those grudgingly, in such institutions.”6 
In the decades that followed, member states’ willingness to fund in-
ternational organizations’ regular budgets continued to diminish.7 
The economic havoc wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic will only 
accelerate this preexisting trend. 
To supplement meager regular budgets, international organiza-
tions have turned to voluntary contributions from member states and 
non-state actors.8 While member states today still supply the vast 
majority of voluntary contributions, some private actors have made 
major contributions as well. In 1997, Ted Turner announced a $1 
 
the amount required to provide the agency with even a small chance of moderate 
success in implementing its statutory mandates.”). 
 4 The Global Administrative Law literature identifies other types, which in-
clude transnational networks, hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements, and 
private institutions with regulatory functions. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20–
23 (2005). Funding is a critical issue for these other types of governance arrange-
ments as well. See, e.g., Sandra Moog et al., The Politics of Multi-Stakeholder 
Initiatives: The Crisis of the Forest Stewardship Council, 128 J. BUS. ETHICS 469, 
478–81, 487 (2015). 
 5 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 17. 
 6 JOHN G. STOESSINGER, FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 3 (1964). 
 7 See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 688; Erin R. Graham, Money 
and Multilateralism: How Funding Rules Constitute IO Governance, 7 INT’L 
THEORY 162, 164 (2015); Kristina Daugirdas & Gian Luca Burci, Financing the 
World Health Organization: What Lessons for Multilateralism?, 16 INT’L ORGS. 
L. REV. 299, 300 (2019). 
 8 Even the League of Nations turned to philanthropies to supplement its 
budget. See SUSAN PEDERSEN, THE GUARDIANS 7 (2015). 
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billion gift to the United Nations; more recently, the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation has become a top donor to WHO.9 Over-
all, the total value of voluntary contributions and their share of or-
ganizations’ budgets are growing.10 WHO and the International Or-
ganization for Migration (IOM) are on the far end of the spectrum: 
in recent years, voluntary contributions made up more than 80 per-
cent of WHO’s funding and more than 97 percent of IOM’s fund-
ing.11 In addition, some programs and funds that are part of the 
United Nations, including the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, rely entirely or almost entirely on voluntary contribu-
tions.12 Finally, some regional organizations depend heavily on con-
tributions from sources other than member states. This situation is 
more common for organizations in the Global South, whose member 
states often face daunting economic challenges.13 
At the same time that voluntary contributions are growing in 
size, they are changing along another dimension: voluntary contri-
butions are increasingly earmarked for donors’ preferred projects 
and come attached with various conditions.14 It is easy to see why 
 
 9 Christopher G. Bradley, Partner Capture in Public International Organiza-
tions, 44 AKRON L. REV. 261, 263 (2011); Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 
301. 
 10 See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 2, at 688 (noting the overall trend 
and citing Interpol as an example); Graham, supra note 7, at 183–87 (describing 
growth of voluntary contributions in the U.N. system). 
 11 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 299; François Crépeau (Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Human Rights of Migrants, para. 114, U.N. Doc. A/68/283 (Aug. 7, 2013). 
 12 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 301 n.10 (describing the extent of 
reliance on voluntary contributions by the U.N. Development Program (“en-
tirely”), the U.N. Environment Program (95%), UNICEF (“exclusively”), the 
World Food Program (“entirely”), and the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner 
for Refugees (“almost entirely”)). See also Eric Rosand & Alistair Millar, The Odd 
Couple at the Center of the U.N.’s Counterterrorism Growth, JUST SECURITY (July 
8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71273/the-odd-couple-at-the-center-of-
the-u-n-s-counterterrorism-growth/ (noting that since its establishment in 2017, 
the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism has expanded rapidly to more than 150 staff 
in New York, with additional personnel in six field offices around the globe. “Yet, 
only eight of these positions are funded out of the regular U.N. budget, which ac-
counts for less than 5 percent of UNOCT’s resources.”). 
 13 See Ulf Engel & Frank Mattheis, The Finances of Regional Organisations 
in the South: Challenges of Studying a Neglected Facet of Regionalism, in THE 
FINANCES OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: FOLLOW THE 
MONEY, supra note 2, at 1. 
 14 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7; Graham, supra note 7, at 183–85. 
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donors prefer to give earmarked contributions: donors can direct 
funds to the projects they find most appealing, perhaps because they 
judge certain projects more likely to be effective or because, in the 
case of member-state donations, they find certain projects easier to 
justify to the national legislatures that hold the purse strings.15 But 
voluntary contributions have some downsides, especially if they 
make up a large fraction of an organization’s budget. Heavy reliance 
on voluntary contributions can erode multilateral governance of in-
ternational organizations and can compromise their work. 
Among the three main components of international organiza-
tions’ incomes—assessed contributions, voluntary contributions 
from member states, and voluntary contributions from non-state ac-
tors—international lawyers have devoted the most attention to the 
first category. They have scrutinized questions about whether and 
when member states might have a legal right to withhold contribu-
tions and the consequences of nonpayment that lacks legal justifica-
tion.16 By contrast, because states are not obliged to supply volun-
tary contributions, such contributions generate fewer legal 
questions.17 As for the third category, legal scholars have begun to 
pay attention to financial contributions from private actors on ac-
count of the distinct risks associated with such contributions.18 
 
 15 See, e.g., Andrew Siddons, McConnell Gets Personal Discussing Polio, 
ROLL CALL (July 10, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/2018/07/10/mcconnell-
gets-personal-discussing-polio/ (tracing Senator Mitch McConnell’s support for 
the WHO’s polio-eradication programs to McConnell’s childhood experience with 
polio); Vera Z. Eichenauer & Bernhard Reinsberg, What Determines Earmarked 
Funding to International Development Organizations? Evidence from the New 
Multi-Bi Aid Data, 12 REV. INT’L ORGS. 171, 171, 186–88 (2017) (systematically 
reviewing motives for why donor countries give earmarked aid and presenting em-
pirical evidence that “earmarked aid serves many purposes”). For a discussion of 
the types of projects that regularly fail to attract voluntary contributions, see 
Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 317–20.  
 16 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United Nations’ a la 
Carte Problem, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 229 (1991); Elizabeth Zoller, The Corporate 
Will of the United Nations and the Rights of the Minority, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 610 
(1987); Francesco Francioni, Multilateralism à la Carte: The Limits to Unilateral 
Withholdings of Assessed Contributions to the UN Budget, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 43 
(2000). 
 17 See James E. Archibald, Pledges of Voluntary Contributions to the United 
Nations by Member States: Establishing and Enforcing Legal Obligations, 36 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 317, 317–18 (2004). 
 18 See Bradley, supra note 9, at 261–63; LILIANA B. ANDONOVA, 
GOVERNANCE ENTREPRENEURS 76–88 (2017); Ayelet Berman, Between Partici-
pation and Capture in International Rule-Making: The WHO Framework of 
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Member states, too, have taken action to address such contributions. 
In 2016, the World Health Assembly adopted a Framework for En-
gagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA), which was the first ef-
fort in the U.N. system to comprehensively regulate WHO’s inter-
actions—including fundraising—with the private sector, 
philanthropic foundations, non-governmental organizations, and ac-
ademic institutions.19  
To the extent that scholars and practitioners have focused on 
voluntary contributions from member states, the main solutions they 
have advanced are increasing assessed contributions and reducing 
the level and extent of earmarks on voluntary contributions.20 Such 
efforts are worthwhile, but they have yielded only modest results, as 
earmarked contributions have continued to grow. The pressures on 
governments to earmark their contributions to international organi-
zations are unlikely to relent. Indeed, the trend towards earmarked 
giving extends to other areas of philanthropic giving and is not lim-
ited to contributions to international organizations.21  
 
Engagement with Non-State Actors, 32 EUR. J. INT’L L. 227 (2021). See also Mar-
garet H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Patriotic Philanthropy: Financing the State 
with Gifts to Government, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1129 (2018) (addressing such gifts 
at the national and local level). 
 19 See WHO, World Health Assembly Res. 69.10, Framework of Engagement 
with Non-State Actors, WHO Doc. A69/VR/8 (May 28, 2016) [hereinafter 
FENSA]. 
 20 The most sophisticated and extensive effort on this front is the development 
of the Voluntary Indicative Scale of Contributions at the U.N. Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), which sought to broaden the donor base to UNEP and increase 
the levels of unearmarked voluntary contributions to UNEP’s Environment Fund. 
These efforts were successful in the initial phases of their implementation, but less 
so in recent years. See U.N. Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC], Independ-
ent Team of Advisers, A New Funding Architecture of the UN Development System 
for the 2030 Agenda: Options and Challenges, Annex IV (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/ecosoc-
dialogue-funding-of-unds.pdf; Executive Director of U.N. Environment Pro-
gramme, Voluntary Indicative Scale of Contributions, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/EA.4/INF/11 (Feb. 13, 2019). 
 21 See, e.g., Joye Mercer, Strings Attached, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Mar. 10, 
1995) (noting that “[o]n more and more campuses, donations for unrestricted pur-
poses are barely holding steady, while restricted giving—money for specific goals 
and programs—has been climbing fast”); Strobe Talbott & Kimberly Churches, 
Safeguarding Charity Independence, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 2, 2016) (de-
scribing a “surge” in “project-based—that is, restricted—funding” to charitable 
organizations as “more and more donors are concentrating on projects that are in 
line with their own civic, cultural, intellectual, and humanitarian interests.”). 
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This Article advances a different solution: regulating voluntary 
contributions from member states. Part I elaborates on the risks as-
sociated with such contributions. Part II describes the mix of formal 
and informal policies and practices that currently regulate such con-
tributions and argues that these policies are insufficient. Part III out-
lines several possibilities for developing more comprehensive, for-
mal regulation of voluntary contributions. 
I. WHY WORRY? 
When earmarked voluntary contributions make up a significant 
fraction of an organization’s budget, the governance bodies for-
mally tasked with determining the organization’s budget may lose 
control over the organization’s priorities and activities.22 In the ex-
treme case, individual donors would choose which activities to fund. 
The organization’s activities would not be the result of a coherent 
strategy or plan, nor would they be determined through a transparent 
and deliberative process. Instead, the organization’s activities would 
reflect the aggregate of individual donors’ decisions. Moreover, 
long-term planning would be challenging, if not impossible, due to 
the unpredictability of voluntary contributions.23 The result has been 
characterized as “Trojan multilateralism”—a veneer that masks the 
dominance of individual donors’ goals and interests within multilat-
eral organizations.24 These concerns about hollowing out govern-
ance mechanisms may be especially acute when donors are private 
entities or non-member states who have no formal role in governing 
the organization.25  
Moreover, member states may use their voluntary contributions 
to advance their own national agendas and thereby undermine the 
international character of international organizations. For example, 
sometimes donor states seek to preclude WHO from using voluntary 
 
 22 See Graham, supra note 7, at 185–90. 
 23 See Archibald, supra note 17, at 317. 
 24 See Devi Sridhar & Ngaire Woods, Trojan Multilateralism: Global Coop-
eration in Health, 4 GLOB. POL’Y 325 (2013); Jacob Katz Cogan, Financing and 
Budgets, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 903, 
918–19 (Jacob Katz Cogan et al. eds., 2016). 
 25 See, e.g., Nickson Bondo Museka, The Finances of the International Con-
ference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), in THE FINANCES OF REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2, at 76 
(observing that the priorities of ICGLR’s external funders differ from those of 
member states). 
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contributions to assist states on which the donor state has imposed 
unilateral sanctions.26 Sometimes donor states condition voluntary 
contributions on WHO’s hiring of the donor state’s nationals to im-
plement the funded project.27 
International organizations’ reliance on voluntary contributions 
is particularly troubling for certain kinds of work. One category is 
normative work, such as setting standards and identifying best prac-
tices. The risk here is that instead of reflecting the organization’s 
best expert judgment and an international perspective, the normative 
work will reflect, for example, the donors’ desire to protect or en-
hance powerful domestic industries. Even in the absence of actual 
influence, the perception that the integrity of an international organ-
ization’s normative work has been compromised may make the or-
ganization’s normative work less trusted and less effective. 
Similarly vulnerable is work that involves evaluating the con-
duct of member states and holding those states accountable, includ-
ing through public criticism, when they fall short. The concern here 
is that, in response to subtle or overt pressure, secretariat staff will 
selectively refrain from such criticism to avoid losing voluntary 
contributions. Strikingly, numerous offices and programs whose 
work actually or potentially involves such evaluation and criticism 
rely quite heavily on voluntary contributions. For example, the Of-
fice of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
had a $179 million budget in 2019, with voluntary contributions fur-
nishing 63 percent of this total.28  
The fewer the donors, the greater the unease about voluntary 
contributions funding such work. For example, voluntary contribu-
tions from Qatar and Saudi Arabia supply more than 80 percent of 
the budget of the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism; commentators 
have suggested that reliance on these funds explains the office’s 
scant “appetite for properly addressing human rights violations that 
arise from a member state’s counterterrorism laws and 
 
 26 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 327 (describing the role of the 
WHO’s legal office in screening funding agreements for such provisions). 
 27 See id. 
 28 See OHCHR’s Funding and Budget, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2021). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights relied 
on voluntary contributions to overcome a severe financial crisis in 2016. See Ka-
rima Bennoune, In Defense of Human Rights, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1209, 
1210 n.3 (2019). 
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operations.”29 In 2016, Saudi Arabia threatened U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon with cutting funding to counterterrorism and 
humanitarian relief programs unless Ban removed the “Saudi Ara-
bia-led coalition” in Yemen from its published list of parties to 
armed conflict that commit grave violations against children.30 Ban 
succumbed to that pressure. Unusually, he acknowledged doing so 
in a press conference shortly thereafter: 
I . . . had to consider the very real prospect that millions of other 
children would suffer grievously if, as was suggested to me, 
countries would defund many UN programmes. Children already 
at risk in Palestine, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and so many 
other places would fall further into despair. . . . I’m Chief Ad-
ministrative Officer of this Organization. . . . I had to make a de-
cision to keep all United Nations operations, particularly human-
itarian operations, continuing.31 
Ban may have been more willing to speak out in this instance 
because he was nearing the end of his tenure as Secretary-General: 
he would not need to beseech Saudi Arabia for cooperation and fi-
nancial assistance much longer.32 Perhaps Ban judged that, at that 
moment, he personally could draw the fire with less risk to the 
United Nations as a whole.  
II. REGULATION OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MEMBER 
STATES 
Overall, very few formal policies govern voluntary contribu-
tions from member states. WHO is an illuminating case study be-
cause it is at the extreme end of international organizations in the 
degree to which it relies on voluntary contributions. This Part first 
 
 29 Rosand & Millar, supra note 12. 
 30 See U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 164–175, 
U.N. Doc. A/70/836-S/2016/360 (Apr. 20, 2016). Accord Colum Lynch, Saudi 
Arabia Threatened to Break Relations with U.N. Over Human Rights Criticism in 
Yemen, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 7, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/07/- 
saudi-arabia-threatened-to-break-relations-with-un-over-human-rights-criticism-
in-yemen/. 
 31 U.N. Secretary-General, Full Transcript of Secretary-General’s Press En-
counter (June 9, 2016), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/- 
2016-06-09/full-transcript-secretary-generals-press-encounter. 
 32 Ban’s term ended December 31, 2016, only seven months after the press 
conference. See Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/formersg/ban.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).  
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details the formal policies that exist at WHO for mitigating the risks 
described above and some of the informal practices that supplement 
them. This Part then explains why such informal strategies are not 
up to the task. 
A. Formal and Informal Policies and Practices at WHO 
From quite early in its history, WHO has explored creative 
ways to identify and tap sources of income beyond its assessed con-
tributions from governments.33 The WHO Constitution supplies a 
clear legal basis for doing so. Article 57 provides: 
The Health Assembly or the [Executive] Board acting on behalf 
of the Health Assembly may accept and administer gifts and be-
quests made to the Organization provided that the conditions at-
tached to such gifts or bequests are acceptable to the Health As-
sembly or the Board and are consistent with the objective and 
policies of the Organization.34 
In turn, the Health Assembly delegated to the Director-General 
the authority to accept such gifts and bequests, “provided that he or 
she has determined that such contributions can be used by the Or-
ganization, and that any conditions which may be attached to them 
are consistent with the objective and policies of the Organization.”35  
Member states and the WHO secretariat have both taken steps 
to address the first set of concerns described in the previous Part: 
that reliance on voluntary contributions will hollow out the organi-
zation’s formal governance bodies and impede coherent decision-
making across the range of WHO’s activities and planning over 
time. As former WHO Director-General Margaret Chan put it: 
We can take some pride in the fact that voluntary contributions 
have increased steadily and substantially. In a sense, this ex-
presses confidence that support for the work of WHO is a good 
investment.  
 
 33 See STOESSINGER, supra note 6, at 220–26 (detailing WHO’s early efforts 
to sell stamps and seals to the public, to secure loans from the World Bank, and to 
establish various special funds for collecting contributions from governments as 
well as from foundations, industries, labor organizations, and individuals). 
 34 WHO Const. art. 57. 
 35 WHO, FINANCIAL REGULATIONS AND FINANCIAL RULES OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Regulation 8.1 (2014). 
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But it shapes the agenda beyond the control of Member States, 
lets resources drive priorities, and greatly diminishes Member-
State oversight of resources and expenditures.36 
Chan proposed that the Health Assembly start approving the 
entire WHO budget, not just the portion financed by assessed con-
tributions. She explained: “Doing so would be a major departure 
from past practices and would return the responsibility for oversight 
to Member States.”37 In 2013, the World Health Assembly adopted 
Chan’s proposal and inaugurated new budget practices.38 To better 
align voluntary contributions with the approved budget, the Health 
Assembly’s budget resolutions began imposing budget ceilings on 
voluntary contributions, capping the total amount that the organiza-
tion could collect both overall and in each of the six categories of its 
work.39 The budget resolutions also granted the WHO Director-
General greater flexibility to direct assessed contributions to pro-
grams that struggled to attract voluntary contributions.40 
Separately, the WHO secretariat sought to persuade member 
states to eliminate, or at least to “lighten” restrictions and conditions 
on their voluntary contributions.41 Around 2004, WHO established 
a specified category of “core voluntary contributions” that could be 
used at the Director-General’s discretion to close budgetary gaps 
and support programs that failed to attract much voluntary fund-
ing.42 This category has not proved particularly appealing to mem-
ber states; during the 2016–17 biennium, only 4 percent of all vol-
untary contributions were “core” contributions.43 More recently, 
recognizing the reticence among many donors to provide wholly un-
restricted funds, the secretariat has shifted to a strategy of working 
with donors to “reshape” their voluntary contributions so that 
 
 36 WHO, Director-General Addresses Reforms in WHO Financing, (Dec. 6, 
2012), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-ad-
dresses-reforms-in-who-financing. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 313–15. 
 39 See id. at 315. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. at 327. For a broader discussion of “earmarking intensity,” see 
Eichenauer & Reinsberg, supra note 15, at 174. 
 42 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 324–25. 
 43 World Health Organization, WHO RESULTS REPORT: PROGRAMME BUDGET 
2016-2017, at https://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/budget-por-
tal/rr_2016-17.pdf. 
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earmarks are less restrictive with respect to geography, subject mat-
ter, or both.44 
With respect to the second risk described above—that member 
states will impose conditions on voluntary funds that are incon-
sistent with WHO’s international character—WHO does not have 
any formally promulgated policies that enumerate the kinds of con-
ditions that might not be “consistent with the objectives and policy 
of the Organization.”45 Instead, it falls to the WHO legal office to 
screen voluntary contributions to eliminate such conditions or re-
quirements.46 
When it comes to protecting its normative, standard-setting 
work from actual or perceived influence by funders, the World 
Health Assembly has adopted a formal policy regarding funding 
from non-state actors. Among other things, FENSA prohibits WHO 
from accepting financial or in-kind contributions from private-sec-
tor entities for its normative work.47 But there is no parallel policy 
regulating voluntary contributions from member states. Instead, 
WHO officials take steps to mitigate the risks associated with such 
contributions on a “case-by-case” basis.48 The officials that run in-
dividual offices make a point of trying to avoid relying on single 
donors to fund their normative projects.49 
As for work that involves publicly criticizing member states 
where they fall short, the WHO secretariat largely avoids it. WHO’s 
heavy reliance on voluntary contributions may help to explain this 
nonconfrontational approach. During the SARS outbreak in 2003, 
then-Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland criticized China for 
its lack of transparency, saying: 
It would have been better if the Chinese government had been 
more open in the early stages, from November to March. . . . We 
were asking questions, wanting to send in experts to help identify 
the source. It took too long before they felt the need to be helped. 
Next time something strange and new comes . . . let us in as soon 
as possible.50 
 
 44 Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 327–28. 
 45 See WHO Const. art. 57; id. at Regulation 8.1. 
 46 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 327. 
 47 See FENSA, supra note 19, at 25. 
 48 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 327. 
 49 See id. 
 50 THOMAS ABRAHAM, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PLAGUE 101 (2007).  
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All things considered, Brundtland’s reproach was fairly mild; 
nevertheless, her comments garnered significant attention because 
they reflected a significant break from WHO’s standard modus op-
erandi of quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy.51 Spurred to action by 
the SARS outbreak, the World Health Assembly revised the Inter-
national Health Regulations governing disease outbreaks in 2005.52 
These revisions provided an opening for the WHO Director-General 
to make public criticism of member states a standard practice: the 
revised Regulations require the Director-General to report to the 
Health Assembly on the implementation of the new Regulations.53 
States’ lackluster implementation has provided plenty of fodder for 
such criticism.54 Yet year after year, Directors-General have re-
frained from “naming and shaming” noncomplying states. The sec-
retariat’s reports present data on compliance in a “consolidated, de-
identified format.”55 The secretariat’s analysis of specific instances 
of alleged violations is posted on a website that is not available to 
the public.56 
One final WHO practice with respect to voluntary contribu-
tions that is worth mentioning concerns transparency and reporting. 
Each year, WHO releases information about the voluntary contribu-
tions it receives from member states and from other sources.57 These 
annual reports identify donors and the size of their contributions. 
Importantly, however, while these reports identify earmarked vol-
untary contributions as a category, they do not specify the nature of 
 
 51 Like Ban Ki-moon in the example described above, Brundtland made these 
comments in the final months of her term as Director-General. See Gavin Yamey, 
Head of WHO to Stand Down, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 457, 457 (2002) (noting that 
Brundtland’s term of office ended in July 2003). 
 52 See WHO, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d ed. 2005). 
 53 See id. art. 54(1). 
 54 See Adam Kamradt-Scott, The International Health Regulations (2005): 
Strengthening Their Effective Implementation and Utilisation, 16 INT’L ORGS. L. 
REV. 242, 251–52 (2019) (describing states’ noncompliance with the International 
Health Regulations in connection with the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic and the 
2014-2016 West African Ebola outbreak). 
 55 Id. at 251–52, 255. 
 56 Gian Luca Burci, The Outbreak of COVID-19 Coronavirus: are the Interna-
tional Health Regulations fit for purpose? EJIL:Talk! (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-outbreak-of-covid-19-coronavirus-are-the-interna-
tional-health-regulations-fit-for-purpose/. 
 57 See, e.g., WHO, Voluntary Contributions by Fund and by Contributor, 
2019, U.N. Doc. A73/INF./3 (June 29, 2020). 
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the earmarks.58 Nor are other conditions or requirements associated 
with the contribution reported.59 The absence of this information 
makes it impossible to determine, for example, the extent to which 
secretariat staff succeeded in finding multiple donors to support its 
normative work. 
B. Problems with Reliance on Informal Practices 
There are a number of reasons to doubt the adequacy of infor-
mal policies and practices as a bulwark against the risks associated 
with voluntary contributions from member states. Informal policies 
are, by definition, not transparent to those outside an international 
organization. Outsiders will struggle to discern and evaluate the 
content of those policies and their underlying rationales. Just as im-
portantly, the policies and practices of individual offices may not be 
entirely transparent within an organization. Absent formal written 
policies, there is no guarantee that all of the various offices within 
an international organization are consistently applying the same pol-
icies and following the same practices to mitigate the risks associ-
ated with voluntary contributions from member states. The devel-
opment and implementation of such policies and practices depends 
on the priorities, effectiveness, and commitment of the individuals 
involved. 
Consider again the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR); as noted above, more than 60 percent of 
its budget currently comes from voluntary contributions.60 Unlike 
the WHO Director-General, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights criticizes U.N. member states rather frequently. 61 Indeed, the 
willingness to do so is an essential component of the High Commis-
sioner’s job. When former High Commissioner Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-
Hussein announced that he would not seek a second term in 2017, 
he expressed his fear that the need to secure the votes for a second 
 
 58 See, e.g., id. 
 59 See, e.g., id. 
 60 See OHCHR’s Funding and Budget, supra note 28. 
 61 See, e.g., Jennifer Hansler, Haley Hits UN Human Rights Office Over Con-
demnation of US Immigration Policy, CNN (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/05/politics/un-human-rights-southern-border-fam-
ilies/index.html; Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation as a Disciplinarian of Interna-
tional Organizations, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 221, 247–48, 258–60 (2019) (describing 
the High Commissioner’s willingness to publicly criticize France when other U.N. 
officials pointedly declined to do so).  
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term might cause him to hold back from making such criticisms of 
member states or their allies: seeking a second term “in the current 
geopolitical context might involve bending a knee in supplication; 
muting a statement of advocacy; lessening the independence and in-
tegrity of my voice.”62 This point would seem to generalize to other 
“asks” that the High Commissioner might make of member states, 
including for voluntary contributions. 
It is not clear what steps OHCHR takes to protect against the 
risk that funding decisions might influence—or might appear to in-
fluence—its work. OHCHR’s website notes that the majority of the 
voluntary contributions it received were earmarked, and that in 2019 
approximately 60 percent of voluntary contributions “[were] used to 
support work in the field,” while the remainder was “distributed be-
tween other areas of the Office’s work.”63 Like WHO, OHCHR pub-
lishes on its website and in annual reports information about the 
identities of its donors and the amounts that they gave.64 The annual 
reports identify categories of earmarked contributions, but they do 
not reveal any details about the earmarks or other conditions that 
individual donors imposed on their contributions.65 OHCHR’s poli-
cies and practices governing its acceptance of voluntary contribu-
tions remain informal or at least not publicly available. 
Even when rules within bureaucracies are formalized, there is 
a risk of what Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore labeled a 
“normalization of deviance.”66 One feature of bright-line rules is 
that, in some subset of cases, applying those rules will lead to out-
comes that disserve the goals that motivated the development of the 
rule in the first place. In such cases, bureaucracies may have some 
capacity to carve out targeted exceptions. The risk, Barnett and 
 
 62 Somini Sengupta & Nick Cumming-Bruce, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, Top Hu-
man Rights Official, Won’t Seek a Second Term, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/un-human-rights-al-hussein.html. 
 63 OHCHR’s Funding and Budget, supra note 28. 
 64 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER, VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OHCHR IN 2020 (2020), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/FundingBudget/VoluntaryContribu-
tions2020.pdf. 
 65 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2019, at 84–109 
(2020), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRreport2019/. 
 66 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathol-
ogies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 721–22 (1999). 
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Finnemore explain, is that over time, the exception will swallow the 
rule: “what at time t1 might be weighed seriously and debated as a 
potentially unacceptable risk . . . comes to be treated as normal at 
time tn.”67 When policies and practices are informal, such normali-
zation of deviance is even more likely. 
Indeed, as applied to policing voluntary contributions from 
member states, the pressure to create exceptions seems especially 
high. By challenging conditions attached to voluntary contributions 
or refusing such contributions altogether, officials may provoke the 
ire of member states. International civil servants have powerful in-
centives to maintain positive relationships with member states.68 
Moreover, international organizations compete for funding with 
other possible recipients. By challenging conditions attached to a 
voluntary contribution, the organization risks losing the contribution 
and thereby the capacity to undertake the work that the contributions 
would fund. In soliciting voluntary contributions, international or-
ganizations are negotiating from a position of weakness. Under such 
circumstances, international organizations face big incentives to 
find a way to accommodate donor states’ demands. 
The development and implementation of informal policies to 
protect international organizations from the risks associated with 
voluntary contributions is vulnerable to another trend that is affect-
ing many international organizations: their growing reliance on 
short-term contracts instead of regular staff posts.69 A 2012 Joint 
Inspection Unit (JIU) report indicated that around 45 percent of the 
total personnel of the organizations that make up the U.N. system 
were working under non-staff contracts.70 Non-staff personnel fre-
quently outnumber staff at international organizations that rely 
 
 67 Id. at 722. 
 68 See Daugirdas, supra note 61, at 228, 247–48 (2019) (observing that the 
apparent organizational imperative to maintain a reputation for cooperativeness 
with member states aligns with the micro-level incentives that individual IO em-
ployees face not to pick fights with member states). 
 69 See generally Andrés Muñoz Mosquera, On the Notion of Precarious Em-
ployment in International Organizations, 11 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 294 (2014). 
 70 See Cihan Terzi & Papa Louis Fall, U.N. Joint Inspection Unit, Use of Non-
Staff Personnel and Related Contractual Modalities in the United Nations System 
Organizations, U.N. Doc. JIU/Rep/2014/18, at 3 (2014) [hereinafter JIU Report]. 
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heavily on voluntary contributions.71 This recent growth in precari-
ous employment at international organizations mirrors trends in the 
national economies of member states.72  
In describing the consequences for international organizations, 
Andrés Muñoz Mosquera, a NATO legal adviser, distinguished be-
tween two types of staff allegiances: allegiance to the goals or pur-
poses of an international organization and allegiance to the organi-
zation itself.73 The insecurity associated with temporary 
employment may not disturb the former but, Mosquera argued, is 
quite likely to erode the latter.74 This argument makes intuitive 
sense: individuals who do not feel protected by an organization may 
well feel little reciprocal obligation to protect the organization, es-
pecially if the risks to the organization from accepting a particular 
voluntary contribution seem theoretical or will manifest only in the 
long-term. Temporary employees may be less like to identify such 
risks, to be troubled by those risks, and to go out of their way to 
mitigate or avoid such risks in order to protect the organization. 
Precarious employment may undermine the development and 
implementation of informal policies regarding voluntary contribu-
tions in another way as well. Non-staff employment is often, but not 
always, short-term.75 A JIU survey of non-staff personnel revealed 
that roughly half had stayed with the same organization for fewer 
than five years while half had stayed for more than five years.76 Per-
sonnel who stay with an organization for a shorter time have less 
opportunity to acquire experience and expertise; they also have less 
opportunity to pass on their experience to their colleagues.77 More-
over, with constant churn among staff, it is less likely that informal 
rules and their underlying rationales will be clearly and comprehen-
sively communicated to all staff who ought to be implementing 
 
 71 See id. at 75 (indicating that non-staff make up more than 50 percent of the 
total workforce at UNDP, FAO, and WHO, among other organizations and pro-
grams). 
 72 See Mosquera, supra note 69, at 313–14, 316. See also JIU Report, supra 
note 70, at 18 (noting that, inter alia, budgetary restrictions, lack of resources, and 
unpredictable funding are among the reasons for hiring non-staff personnel). 
 73 See Mosquera, supra note 69, at 301. 
 74 See id.  
 75 See JIU Report, supra note 70 at 48, 73. 
 76 See id. at 73. 
 77 Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 792 (2013). 
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them. The ever-present risk that exceptions will swallow rules only 
grows in this context.78 For all these reasons, continuity and con-
sistency in implementing informal policies is likely to be particu-
larly difficult to maintain in the current environment. 
III. NEXT STEPS 
In light of the deficiencies of relying on informal policies and 
practices to mitigate the risks associated with voluntary contribu-
tions from states, it is worth considering what more formal regula-
tions might look like.79 A big obstacle to offering up a set of sub-
stantive rules is a lack of information about current informal 
practices, including how much they vary within and across organi-
zations, how those variations are justified, and how insiders—much 
less outsiders—evaluate the adequacy of those practices. This lack 
of information means that, for example, proposing specific amend-
ments to organizations’ financial rules and regulations is premature 
at this point. Instead, the crucial first step is more disclosure and 
discussion of existing policies and practices, especially the informal 
ones. 
Even under these circumstances, it is possible to outline some 
options and considerations that ought to guide the development of 
formal regulations. To start, such regulations might focus on sub-
stance or procedure. Substantive regulations might enumerate the 
kinds of conditions on voluntary contributions that are prohibited. 
In addition, they might address how the earmarks for voluntary con-
tributions must relate to various decisions that are made by the sec-
retariats or by member states, such as annual or biannual budgets or 
multi-year strategic plans. Substantive regulations might also set a 
minimum number of donors for a given project or set a ceiling on 
the share of funds for a project that can be provided by a single do-
nor.  
Another question for substantive regulations is whether they 
ought to be hortatory or mandatory. Such substantive regulations 
might come in the form of recommendations or best practices, or 
 
 78 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (describing Barnett and Fin-
nemore’s discussion of the “normalization of deviance”). 
 79 By way of comparison, consider the factors that make governments’ ac-
ceptance of gifts from private philanthropists more and less problematic. See 
Lemos & Charles, supra note 18, at 1133–35 (2018). 
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they might be firmer requirements backed up by penalties—such as 
disciplinary proceedings—for noncompliance. The World Bank’s 
process for initiating loans, for example, is regulated by a mix of 
aspirational targets and mandatory requirements. To assure compli-
ance with the mandatory requirements, the Bank has established 
both internal mechanisms—like random audits and post-project re-
view—and an independent external mechanism that allows individ-
uals who have been harmed by noncompliance with the Bank’s 
mandatory requirements to bring complaints.80 
Separately, procedural regulations might serve as an alternative 
or as a supplement to such substantive regulations. Process regula-
tions might specify who within the organization’s secretariat must 
approve individual contributions before they are accepted or who 
must approve deviations from best practices or other requirements. 
Process regulations might also require disclosures regarding the na-
ture of earmarks, conditions, or the number of funders for individual 
projects. Such disclosures might be made to member states, to the 
public, or to both. Disclosure to member states alone, however, 
would probably fail to provoke much-needed deliberation and ac-
tion.81 
For both substantive and procedural regulations, there is an ad-
ditional question of how and by whom the implementation of these 
regulations will be policed. In any organization—and for any pol-
icy—there may be gaps between what the formal policy prescribes 
and what happens on the ground. In some cases, the failure to follow 
through and ensure implementation can reflect a deliberate effort to 
insulate on-the-ground operations from the formal policy.82 A re-
lated concern is the possibility that donors’ demands in connection 
with voluntary contributions will be increasingly communicated in-
formally rather than being documented in formal funding arrange-
ments; such “gentlemen’s agreements” regarding various aspects of 
 
 80 See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance: 
The World Bank Operational Standards in COMMITMENT & COMPLIANCE 291–92 
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2003). 
 81 See Burci, supra note 56. 
 82 See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: For-
mal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOCIO. 340, 355–56 (1977) (iden-
tifying the phenomenon of decoupling—the adoption of formal structures that are 
needed to legitimate organizations while insulating on-the-ground operations from 
those formal structures); CATHERINE WEAVER, HYPOCRISY TRAP 28 (2008) (ex-
tending and applying this analysis to international organizations). 
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governance and operation of international organizations are not un-
common.83  
A final consideration is how formal regulation of voluntary 
contributions would affect dynamics among international organiza-
tions, especially because international organizations compete with 
one another for voluntary contributions. Those dynamics might be 
positive. The process of developing such regulations could contrib-
ute to useful learning and dissemination of best practices among in-
ternational organizations.84 Moreover, the competition among or-
ganizations could yield a race to the top, as organizations seek to 
bolster the legitimacy—and therefore enhance the efficacy—of their 
normative outputs. But that competition could also provoke a race 
to the bottom, as organizations seek to attract more funding by put-
ting up fewer obstacles to donors’ ability to get their way.  
CONCLUSION 
Although this Article has focused on the risks associated with 
earmarked voluntary contributions from member states, it is im-
portant to avoid an unduly negative view of this source of funding 
for international organizations. Voluntary contributions have some 
advantages, including that they can be mobilized quickly in crisis 
situations, and they can make international organizations less vul-
nerable to the problems caused by withholding assessed contribu-
tions.85 All sources of funding for international organizations have 
both benefits and risks. The key is to acknowledge those risks and 
take steps to mitigate them.  
 
 
 83 See Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organi-
zation: The Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 234 
(2009) (describing links between U. S. funding for the U.N. Development Program 
and the nationality of the UNDP administrator). 
 84 Cf. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Partnerships, Emulation, and Coor-
dination: Toward the Emergence of a Droit Commun in the Field of Development 
Finance, in 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 173, 174 (Hassane Cissé et al. eds., 2011) 
(describing the diffusion of policies, rules, and procedures regarding development 
finance among multilateral development banks). 
 85 See Daugirdas & Burci, supra note 7, at 332–36. 
